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In this article, we attempt to extend and nuance the debate on intellectual property (IP)
strategy, appropriation, and open innovation in dynamic and systemic innovation contexts.
We present the case of four generations of mobile telecommunications systems (covering
the period 1980e2015), and describe and analyze the co-evolution of strategic IP man-
agement and innovation ecosystems. Throughout this development, technologies and
technological relationships were governed with different and shifting degrees of formality.
Simultaneously, ﬁrms differentiated technology accessibility across actors and technolo-
gies to beneﬁt from openness and appropriation of innovation. Our analysis shows that the
discussion of competitiveness and appropriability needs to be expanded from the focal
appropriability regime and complementary assets to the larger context of the innovation
ecosystem and its cooperative and competitive actor relations, with dispersed comple-
mentary and substitute assets and technologies. Consequently, the shaping of comple-
mentary and substitute appropriability regimes is central when strategizing in dynamic
and systemic innovation contexts. This holds important implications for the management
of open innovation, innovation ecosystems, platforms, and coopetition.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
An open approach to innovation has in both practice and research been increasingly accepted as a potential source of
competitive advantage, enabling the use of external sources of innovation and external commercialization strategies
(Granstrand, 1982; Granstrand and Sj€olander, 1990; Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough et al., 2006; Dahlander and Gann, 2010;
West and Bogers, 2014; Cassiman and Valentini, 2016). Every open innovation activity involves two or more actors, and a ﬁrm
that engages in open innovation is part of a system of interconnected innovation actors, resources, activities, and institutions,
connected by organizational andmarket relations.We here denote such a system an innovation ecosystem.With an increased
awareness of the systemic nature of open innovation there have been several calls for research that brings increased un-
derstanding of the systems level of open innovation (Chesbrough and Bogers, 2014; West et al., 2014; Bogers et al., 2017).ersson), ove.granstrand@chalmers.se (O. Granstrand), marcel@ifro.ku.dk (M. Bogers).
ier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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in an integrated ﬁrm is the question of how ﬁrms appropriate or proﬁt from innovation (Teece, 2006, Teece, forthcoming).
Teece (1986) identiﬁed the role of appropriability regimes and complementary assets for explaining the distribution of proﬁts
from innovation in the 1980s. An important contribution was that when the appropriability regime is weak, i.e., when
imitation is easy, it is important for innovators to establish positions in complementary assets in order to appropriate value
from innovation. However, complementary technologies (as a subset of complementary assets) did not receive much explicit
attention and the role of intellectual property (IP) strategy for the appropriability regimewas not well developed at that time,
as later described by Teece (2006). Today we know that IP strategy plays an important role for ﬁrms’ competitiveness
(Granstrand,1999; Pisano, 2006; Teece, 2006; Pisano and Teece, 2007; Somaya, 2012), and that innovation often takes place in
complex multi-technology systems with complementary innovations spread across actors (Granstrand et al., 1997; Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001; Bessen, 2004; Teece, 2009; Somaya et al., 2011; Granstrand and Holgersson, 2013; Teece, forthcoming).
Complex innovation settings require ﬁrms' IP strategies to include protection and/or sharing of their own technologies on
the one hand and access to others' technologies on the other hand (Alexy et al., 2009; Somaya et al., 2011; Granstrand and
Holgersson, 2013). In such settings IP strategy impacts appropriability both directly, through improved and protected sales
and margins, and indirectly, for example through cross-licensing agreements, improved negotiation positions, standard-
setting, blocking of others' R&D, and improved provision of complementary innovations (Arundel et al., 1995; Duguet and
Kabla, 1998; Granstrand, 1999; Bekkers et al., 2002a; Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011; Holgersson and Wallin, 2017). More-
over, a speciﬁc ﬁrm's freedom to operate, i.e., the ability to do business without being excluded by the IP rights (IPRs) of
others, is impacted by the ﬁrm's own IP strategy as well as other ﬁrms' IP strategies (Granstrand, 1999; Lemley and Shapiro,
2007; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Somaya et al., 2011; Holgersson and Wallin, 2017; Jell et al., forthcoming).
In this paper, we want to shed light on the complexities that emerge when innovation takes place across actors in
innovation ecosystems, implying an evolution of innovation and IP strategy across actors over time. We will present the case
of mobile telecommunication systems in the period 1980e2015 to describe and analyze the co-evolution of strategic IP
management and innovation ecosystems. Hereby, we extend and nuance the debate on IP strategy, appropriation, and open
innovation in dynamic and systemic innovation contexts. The generational shifts in mobile telecommunication systems
highlight the systemic and dynamic nature of such an open innovation context in which the role of IP strategy is not so much
to provide short-term proﬁts from single innovations as it is to ensure long-term competitive advantage within the inno-
vation ecosystemdan advantage that is dependent on both internal and external innovations.
Our analysis leads to several contributions. First we identify the important roles of both collaborating and competing
actors and both complementary and substitute technologies in innovation ecosystems. Second, we explicate the concept of
appropriability, and relate it to the two distinct dimensions of technology governance and technology accessibility. Rather
than focusing on the ease of imitation, this perspective acknowledges the fact that ﬁrms can use formal and/or informal
technology governance to obtain high and/or low levels of technology accessibility in order to beneﬁt from various forms of
open and/or closed innovation in compliance with their business models (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Teece, 2010).
Third, we illustrate how ﬁrms need to extend their focus from the focal appropriability regime to its complementary and
substitute appropriability regimes, especially in systems technologies that are subject to standardization.
Theoretical background
The case of mobile telecommunications has been studied by one of the authors since the 1980s, and the use and devel-
opment of theory have consequently evolved alongside the empirical studies over time. Transaction cost theory and its
associated organization theory of the ﬁrm as developed byWilliamson (1975) provided themain framework at the start of the
longitudinal study. The growing use of various quasi-integrated organizational forms for conducting R&D and innovative
activities, such as licensing and inter-ﬁrm collaborations, was identiﬁed early on and a typology of external technology
acquisition and exploitation strategies was developed (Granstrand, 1982; Granstrand and Sj€olander, 1990; Granstrand et al.,
1992) based on contract theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Studies then showed that technology diversiﬁcation and
concomitant external technology acquisition and exploitation play pivotal roles for combining and recombining comple-
mentary technology resources into complementary multi-technology products, thereby generating recombinant growth
(Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994; Granstrand,1998; Cantwell et al., 2004). Today such interorganizational innovation is often
denoted “open innovation”dgoing back to Chesbrough (2003)dand it has received huge attention from both research and
practice.
Open innovation research explains how ﬁrms can rely on external technologies to augment their internal innovation
development or how they can tap into external partners to exploit internally developed technologies (Chesbrough and
Bogers, 2014). This stream of research has paid much attention to how to leverage external sources of innovation with
some key considerations being different mechanisms to obtain such innovation and how to integrate it into the organization
(West and Bogers, 2014). At the same time, there are considerations about possible decreasing returns in terms of external
search and appropriability (Laursen and Salter, 2006, 2014) and not only value-enhancing but also cost-increasing effects of
open innovation (Faems et al., 2010). More generally, open innovation scholars have identiﬁed variousmechanisms in relation
to inbound knowledge ﬂows and to some extent outbound knowledge ﬂows, although these have largely been considered on
the organization level with less attention to higher level attributes such as innovation systems (Chesbrough and Bogers, 2014;
West et al., 2014). Recently, Bogers et al. (2017) proposed the innovation ecosystem as an important unit of analysis for future
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ecosystem.
The concept of open innovation is closely linked to Teece's (1986) proﬁting from innovation (PFI) framework, which ex-
plains not only the role of complementary assets and appropriability regimes for the proﬁtability of innovation, but also the
decision between contracting and integration, i.e. the choice between open and closed innovation in some sense. According to
Teece (1986), the ability of innovators to proﬁt from innovation is impacted by both the appropriability regime at hand (which
is related to the nature of the technology and to the legal means by which it can be protected) and by the access to com-
plementary assets. The framework differentiates between three types of complementary assetsdgeneric (general purpose),
specialized (having a unilateral dependence between the asset and a focal innovation) and co-specialized (having a bilateral
dependence)dbe they tangible or intangible assets. Teece's conclusion is that when imitation is easy, i.e., when the appro-
priability regime is weak, innovators need complementary assets, such as manufacturing assets, distribution assets, service
assets, and complementary technologies, in order to appropriate value from innovation. Another conclusion is that “con-
tracting [e.g., licensing] rather than integrating is likely to be the optimal strategy when the innovators appropriability regime
is tight and the complementary assets are available in competitive supply (i.e. there is adequate capacity and a choice of
sources)” (Teece, 1986, p. 293). Thus, the framework already from the outset addressed the relationship between appro-
priability and what would eventually be termed open innovation. However, the framework initially placed limited explicit
focus on IP strategy and complementary technologies. These have received increasing attention more recently (Teece, 2006;
Pisano and Teece, 2007; Teece, forthcoming).
Extant IP management literature increasingly accounts for the fact that ﬁrms adopt various types of open innovation
strategies and thereby need to match their IP strategies with this (e.g., Alexy et al., 2009; Somaya, 2012; Granstrand and
Holgersson, 2014; Manzini and Lazzarotti, 2016). This stream of literature has shown that, despite the fact that open inno-
vation is related to knowledge sharing across ﬁrm boundaries, patents have an important role to play (Bogers, 2011; Zobel
et al., 2016; Zobel et al., 2017) and are actually perceived as more important in open innovation settings than in closed
innovation settings (Hagedoorn and Zobel, 2015; Holgersson and Granstrand, 2017). Open innovation, and the related
knowledge diffusion, increases the risks of imitation (Veer et al., 2016), the risks of being blocked by others (Blind et al., 2006),
and the need for safeguarding bargaining power over time, and consequently increases the value of protecting technologies
with patents (Holgersson and Granstrand, 2017).
This literature typically takes the perspective of a focal ﬁrm, and there is a need to better understand the systemic nature
and the long term strategy interactions and dynamics across actors (Teece, forthcoming). A ﬁrm that employs a very pro-
tective patent strategy may for example beneﬁt from high margins in the short run, but suffer from a lack of complementary
innovations or retaliatory patenting of complementors in the longer run, and a ﬁrm that employs an open source strategymay
beneﬁt from wide use of its technology, quick adaptations, and many contributors in the short run, while losing its
competitiveness as an exclusive provider of the technology in the longer run. Thus, relationships in open innovation, tech-
nology markets, and innovation ecosystems are seldom symmetrical, and asymmetries may shift over time, for example due
to technological changes and shifts between product and technology generations (Granstrand, 1999), due to strategic and
business model changes (Baden-Fuller and Haeﬂiger, 2013; Hacklin et al., forthcoming), or due to entries and exits of actors in
the innovation ecosystem.
In the remainder of this paper we will focus on this complex co-evolution of strategic IP management and innovation
ecosystems. We will do so by describing and analyzing the case of mobile telecommunications, an industry where patenting,
licensing, and litigating have increased rapidly since its inception.Methodological approach
Case selection and virtues of multi-generation studies
For the purposes of this article, a longitudinal case enables a rich picture of the studied phenomenon covering de-
velopments over long periods of time. As noted by Hargadon and Douglas (2001, p. 480) “historical case studies […] provide a
perspective that covers the decades often necessary to observe an innovation's emergence and stabilization”. It is moreover
necessary to take a longitudinal perspective when studying strategic interplay that evolves over time. The case of mobile
telecommunications was chosen due to several reasons. First, the development has from the outset taken place in an
innovation ecosystem, which is the subject of study as a phenomenon that needs further research to be fully understood (von
Krogh et al., 2012; Adner and Kapoor, 2016). Second, two of the authors are part of a research group having studied the
development of this industry since the 1980s within several sub-studies, enabling ongoing access to primary data. Third, it is
an empirically well researched case in innovation and technology management, thus containing rich additional secondary
data relevant to this study (e.g., Bekkers et al., 2002a, b; Gandal et al., 2003; Sadowski et al., 2003; West, 2006; Dittrich and
Duysters, 2007; Fuentelsaz et al., 2008; Bekkers and West, 2009; Di Minin and Bianchi, 2011; Hacklin et al., forthcoming).
There are and have been multiple competing technological standards in the mobile telecommunications sector over the
years. This article describes the four generations commonly referred to as 1G-4G in the mobile telecommunication sector and
associated with particular standards, starting off with the analog 1G Nordic telecommunication standard NMT, followed with
signiﬁcant overlaps by the digital 2G-4G standards being used in Europe, and becoming increasingly globalized over
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UMTS (3G), and LTE-Advanced (4G).
This type of multi-generation study involving multiple generation shifts have several virtues in general, virtues that this
paper will but cannot fully illustrate. First of all, formation of generations of product and/or process innovations over long
periods of time is quite typical for high-tech industries and thus constitute an important phenomenon with ample oppor-
tunities for comparative studies across time and across industries. A second virtue is that generation shifts tend to involve
more drastic or discontinuous inter-generational changes in the passage from one generation to another than more
continuous intra-generational changes. Long range changes and their transitory dynamic mechanisms may thereby be more
easily detected. In particular, detection of separate stages, periods or eras in business history may thereby be enabled. Third,
managing technological transitions and disruptive innovation in connection with product/process generation shifts consti-
tute one of the most important but difﬁcult areas in strategic management. This is so since dynamic innovation-based
Schumpeterian competition tends to intensify during such transitions, leading to reversals of technological leads and lags
and losses of margins and market shares, including entries and exits. At the same time organizational and managerial
behavior tends to become aligned with and foster incremental change in between such transitions. Fourth, many innovation
studies focus on single technological transitions (or shifts) and disruptive innovation rather than a sequence of several. Such
studies then tend to lose sight of the long-run dynamics of intermittent leadership with catching-up, forging ahead, falling
behind, coming-back, etc., in a multi-technology context.Empirical data and analysis
The empirical base of the case includes secondary data from a wide range of sources, including research articles, journal
articles, annual reports, press releases, etc., complementedwith primary data from interviews and patent statistics, all in all in
order to provide as much data and as much opportunities as possible for triangulation (Jick, 1979; Langley, 1999). The in-
terviews related to the research project behind this article, consist of well over a hundred interviews with R&D, IP, and/or
standardization managers of ﬁrms such as Ericsson, Google, Huawei, Intellectual Ventures, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, NTT
DoCoMo, Samsung, Sony, and Telia, including interviews from former projects dating back up to three decades as part of a
number of studies on the developments in the telecommunication industry. These studies have resulted in a number of
articles, books, and theses, where additional information is available (cf. Granstrand et al., 1992; Granstrand,1993; Oskarsson,
1993; Bohlin and Granstrand, 1994; Oskarsson and Sj€oberg, 1994; Bohlin, 1995; Granstrand et al., 1997; Granstrand, 1999;
Granstrand and Lindmark, 2002; Lindmark, 2002; Granstrand and Holgersson, 2012; Holgersson, 2012; Granstrand,
forthcoming).1 For clarity we here refer to earlier publications whenever applicable.
We use patent data as an additional source of information. The patents necessary for the use of a standard are commonly
called standard-essential patents (SEPs),2 relating to essential technologies without which the system does not function. We
here also use the more general concept of systems-essential patents/technologies, denoting patents/technologies that are
necessary for the functionality of a technological system that may or may not be standardized. Technological systems consist
of several complementary components (with underlying technologies and patents) and the complementarity relation be-
tween two components could be strong (essential) or weak (non-essential), and asymmetric/symmetric. Two or more
components could moreover be technically substitutable, i.e., they could bilaterally replace each other. In case substitutable
components are jointly essential in the sense that the systemwill not functionwithout at least one of them, they are no longer
individually essential.
Given this complex interdependence between essentiality, complementarity, and substitutability, it is far from clear how
to deﬁne a patent as either essential or non-essential for a standard despite the increasing importance of such a distinction.
Essential patents for the standards under study are currently self-reported by companies to standardization organizations
such as the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Due to essential patents being self-reported, there are
many non-essential patents being included in the records as a result of companies’ incentives to promote their roles as in-
novators in order to increase royalty income and bargaining power. Hence, the number of reported essential patents must be
distinguished from the number of patents that are objectively evaluated essential, where evaluated essential patents are fewer
and a subset of the reported essential patents. While the reported essential patents can be found in the records of ETSI, these
must be objectively evaluated to receive a measure of the number of evaluated essential patents, and we here use the results
from the evaluations by Fairﬁeld Resources International (2005, 2007, 2009a, b).
Empirical data from our primary sources is combined with data from secondary sources to create the case description.
Data from different (types of) sources is then used to conﬁrm events and relationships between events (Yin, 1994; Dubois and1 For example, one of the authors supervised and took active part in much of the data collection behind the PhD theses by Lindmark, including about
75 interviews (2002, p. 101), and Oskarsson (1993), see for example the paper by Oskarsson and Sj€oberg, which is based on more than 50 interviews
(1994, p. 7).
2 The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which is an ofﬁcial European standards organization, states that essential “as applied to
IPR means that it is not possible on technical (but not commercial) grounds, taking into account normal technical practice and the state of the art generally
available at the time of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or operate EQUIPMENT or METHODS which comply with a
STANDARD without infringing that IPR. For the avoidance of doubt in exceptional cases where a STANDARD can only be implemented by technical solutions,
all of which are infringements of IPRs, all such IPRs shall be considered ESSENTIAL” (ETSI Directives Version 27, May 2010, p. 39).
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patent data conﬁrms information from interviews and journal articles describing Qualcomm's entry in the generation switch
between 2G and 3G. Given our interest for dynamics and evolution, the focus is on identifying and analyzing changes or shifts
in IP strategy and in the innovation ecosystem, especially with regards to the causes and consequences of such changes. A
feature of longitudinal multi-generation studies (in contrast to mere historical studies) is then that the theoretical framework
tends to co-evolve with the collection and analysis of empirical data over time and it might be difﬁcult to disentangle the
inductive and deductive inﬂuences in a kind of elongated abductive approach (Dubois and Gadde, 2002).
Evolution of the innovation ecosystem and strategic IP management in mobile telecommunications
Mobile telecommunication technologies and other information and communication technologies (ICTs) have since the
1980s revolutionized the way we work, interact, and live our lives more generally by extending our ability to process in-
formation and to communicatewithout physical proximity. They have beenmajor drivers of human development andwelfare
during the last few decades and major drivers behind the emergence of a new type of economy with increased emphasis on
intellectual assets, capital, and property (Granstrand, 2000). Due to the large-scale interdependent investments needed for
ICT developments, the systemic nature of ICT-based innovations, and the network effects that are inherent characteristics of
these technologies and the related products and services, ICT developments signiﬁcantly beneﬁt from inter-organizational
collaborations. Such beneﬁts include cost sharing and developing and setting standards that ensure interoperability for
reaping economies of scale, scope and speed. We will here describe how the innovation ecosystem and the strategic IP
management evolved in the mobile telecommunications industry. This section is primarily structured according to different
technological generations. See Fig. 1 for a timeline with some of the main events.
The collaborative development in the ﬁrst generation (NMT)
The development of analog mobile telecommunication technologies in Sweden in the 1960s through the 1980s is a
successful case of international collaboration among national telecom operators in the Nordic countries, and a family of
related companies. This innovation ecosystem consisted of system operators (incumbent service distributors), suppliers of
terminals and base stations, distributors/retail dealers (of terminals), and users (such as public authorities and private users),
see Fig. 2.
The organization of the development of the technical system NMT was by design mixing cooperation and competition
within a hierarchy with collaborating operators as a governing body (in contrast to pure collaborative open innovation). Thus,
the development was not administered within a large, integrated ﬁrm, nor did it emerge as a result of pure, competitive
market forces. Experience from other countries like Germany and Japan did not speak in favor of a high degree of vertical
integration, while a high degree of uncoordinated competition as in the US appeared to be less efﬁcient in allocating resources
in systems development and commercialization. Rather, it appears that the quasi-integrated, or in other terms semi-open,
nature of the development organization was a critical factor behind the success of the 1G NMT system, being the earliest
cellular system in the world with a unique international roaming feature and portable terminals, which quickly became
adopted by various user groups, primarily for use in automobiles.
The actors together had sufﬁcient capabilities within development and technology transfer across several key tech-
nologies, especially radio technology and switching technology. The geographical and cultural proximity between the
Nordic operators and suppliers facilitated such technology transfer. In order to govern the required knowledge sharing
among relevant actors, a special ‘working group’ was established as a center or hub for idea formation, implementation,
and coordination in the network of actors. It was a deliberate policy to promote supplier cooperation and operator adoptionFig. 1. Timeline of four generations of mobile telecommunications.
Fig. 2. The NMT innovation ecosystem (Granstrand, 1993).
M. Holgersson et al. / Long Range Planning 51 (2018) 303e319308of the NMT system through wide and open communication as well as avoidance of patenting, to keep obstacles for adoption
and diffusion as low as possible, at the same time as the domestic markets were protected by monopolies (Granstrand,
1993). The idea was that widespread adoption would lead to increased demand for systems equipment, which through
economies of scale in turn would lead to lower costs, beneﬁting everyone. The NMT group paid much attention to orga-
nizing this interaction early on in an open manner in order to have an industry base ready to manufacture when demand
started to grow.
The Swedish telecom operator had shifted from a (weak) pro-patent regime in the 1950s to an anti-patent regime in the
1960s (due to problems with internal inventor remunerations, i.e. internal governance problems) and then insisted on
abolishing patenting when the NMT group was formed. At the same time some standard-setting organizations (SSOs) in
general insisted on patent-free or at least royalty-free technical standard designs, which in turn fostered defensive/pro-
phylactic publishing and strategic disclosure. The established telephone industry structure of the 1970s and 1980s with
national operators moreover had procurement procedures that favored national suppliers. Much of the development work
also took place among the operators whose output markets were protected. This led to less importance to protect and control
the technological resources. All in all the incentives to patentwereweak. The result was that very little in NMTwas covered by
patents, despite the fact that much speciﬁcation and R&D work was patentable. The discarding of patenting in turn led to a
certain neglect of patent matters in general (Granstrand, 1999).
A shift to patenting in the second generation (GSM)
The analog 1G market in Europe grew rapidly in the 1980s, but with different systems throughout the European countries
therewere limited possibilities for roaming. The Nordic countries made an exceptionwith their joint NMT standard. As a next
step in the European telecommunications development, the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Ad-
ministrations (CEPT) decided to create a pan-European digital 2G mobile phone standard (Besen, 1990; Gandal et al., 2003).
Besides ensuring roaming, a joint standard was to increase economies of scale in equipment production (Gandal et al., 2003),
and later it turned out that the uniform de jure standard in Europe also implied a signiﬁcantly faster diffusion than for 2G in
the US (Fuentelsaz et al., 2008). In 1987, the national operators in CEPT agreed upon using the Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM) in a memorandum of understanding (MoU). The creation of ETSI by the European Commission in
1988 was followed by a transfer of the GSM standard efforts from CEPT to ETSI in 1989 (Bohlin, 1995; Lindmark, 2002; Gandal
et al., 2003).
In this development more actors and technologies became involved. However, a lax patent mentality initially remained
among the European national service providers as well as equipment suppliers. A kind of club mentality had developed in the
telecom community in Europe, with a gentleman's agreement to be generous to each other when it came to patents
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competing systems providers (e.g., Karlsson, 1998), the situation changed drastically when Motorola (a newcomer on the
European scene) started to use patents aggressively against the GSM group, according to some as a result from information
leakage from the GSM standardization work.
Bekkers et al. (2002) summarize a few other reasons for Motorola's patent strategy. First, US ﬁrms were more aware of the
role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) than European ﬁrms in the late 1980s (Granstrand, 1999; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).
Second, while Motorola heavily patented its GSM technology throughout the early development, the European ﬁrms used
limited patenting while relying on their gentleman's agreement as described above (Granstrand, 1999). Third, being a foreign
actor on the European market where domestic ﬁrms were generally favored presumably meant that Motorola had to use
licenses to generate income from its R&D investments. Fourth, not having digital switching systems from which continuous
sales could be generated also implied an increased focus on license revenues (Iversen, 1999).
Eventually Motorola entered into cross-licensing agreements with a limited number of selected parties, including
Alcatel, Ericsson, Nokia, and Siemens (Bekkers et al., 2002b). For companies with no essential or other patents to trade,
licensing costs became a high barrier to entry (West, 2006; Bekkers and West, 2009) e Bekkers et al. (2002a) report total
royalty fees of 29% of the costs of a GSM handset for new entrants. All in all, the conduct of Motorola triggered a new era of
heightened patent awareness and activity in (European) telecommunications, leading to an irreversible track of new
patenting and competitive behavior in general, on which service providers also embarked, pushed by privatization,
liberalization, competition, internationalization and globalization in general. A former CEO of Ericsson described the
behavior of Motorola as a shock that led to Ericsson initiating its strategic IP work, and it had a similar impact also on Nokia
(Granstrand and Holgersson, 2012). Although Motorola initially collected large royalties from the GSM group, updates in
the GSM standard that were necessary to Motorola eventually enabled at least Ericsson to relax its license royalty payments
to Motorola.
Blocking threats in the third generation (UMTS)
The GSM standard became a major success with widespread diffusion worldwide. The European strategy for the third
generation (3G) of mobile telecommunication systems (which was to support a wider range of applications) followed a
similar path as for 2G, including a uniform standard and the same frequency band throughout Europe (Fuentelsaz et al., 2008).
ETSI selected UMTS, a combination of W-CDMA and TD/CDMA, for the third generation, after essentially compromising
between Nokia and Ericsson on one hand (W-CDMA) and Alcatel and Siemens (TD/CDMA) on the other hand (Bekkers and
West, 2009). Since UMTS became a global project involving not only European actors, but also American and Asian ones,
the standardization work was eventually transferred from ETSI to the worldwide standardization organization for third
generation wireless communication, the 3rd generation partnership program (3GPP), adopting similar policies as ETSI
(Leiponen, 2008).
Some learning how to handle IPR issues in standardization had taken place among standardization bodies, and companies
had also learnt how to use patents more strategically in standardization, and the number of patents continued to increase (see
Table 1). An IPR policy had been established in ETSI, and this was transferred also to 3GPP, requiring that in order to be
included in standards, the patents should be licensable on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, a policy
ﬁrst proposed in 1994.3 However, the FRAND terms set no cap on royalty rates, thus leaving important residual rights (Hart,
1995) controlled by the patent holders. The actual access to the distributed technologies therefore remained limited and
highly dependent on individual patent holders.
As described above ETSI decided to opt for the UMTS standard throughout Europe as a compromise between Ericsson and
Nokia on the one hand and Alcatel and Siemens on the other hand. The American ﬁrm Qualcomm, supporting the competing
standard CDMA 2000 following the cdmaOne 2G standard, realized that therewas a great risk that UMTSwould turn out to be
the dominant worldwide 3G standard. UMTS was designed to be backward compatible with GSM. Since GSM dominated the
2G world market, Qualcomm feared that its own 3G technology would be in an unfavorable position, and possibly be locked
out from the 3G market. US companies, especially Qualcomm, supporting CDMA 2000, then tried to inﬂuence ETSI to modify
UMTS in order to make it backward-compatible with their cdmaOne 2G standard and thereby simplify development of
components supporting both UMTS and CDMA 2000 (Bekkers and West, 2009), threatening to otherwise block UMTS with
their CDMA patents (Table 2 gives an indication of the importance of Qualcomm's patents in UMTS/WCDMA). In the end
Qualcomm, who was not part of the UMTS standardization work, asked for roughly 5% of sales in royalty fees from all UMTS
equipment manufacturers, claiming that its patents were essential for UMTS.
The main European companies (notably Ericsson) then threatened to block CDMA2000 in the US, unless there was
reciprocity in licensing, and Ericsson started to plan US litigations. Thus, Ericsson's stake of patents related to CDMA2000 was
central here as a means for retaliation threats. The industry seemed to be deadlocked by a conﬂict that could not be resolved.
However, Ericsson and Qualcommnegotiated a solution behind the scenes. OnMarch 25,1999, the two companies announced
an agreement that included Ericsson acquiring Qualcomm's systems division and associated R&D operations. By doing so,3 A similar rule applies in the framework of the UN organization International Telecommunications Union (ITU) that has been the main international
standardization body in telecom.
Table 2
Top ﬁve evaluated essential patent family holders (patent shares within parentheses).
GSM late WCDMA early WCDMA middle WCDMA late LTE early
Nokia: 67 (42.4%) Nokia: 40 (25.5%) Nokia: 103 (28.8%) Nokia: 138 (26.2%) Nokia: 57 (54.3%)
Ericsson: 31 (19.6%) Ericsson: 34 (21.7%) Ericsson: 83 (23.2%) Ericsson: 99 (18.8%) Ericsson: 14 (13.3%)
Motorola: 19 (12.0%) Qualcomm: 30 (19.1%) Qualcomm: 44 (12.3%) Qualcomm: 53 (10.1%) Qualcomm: 8 (7.6%)
Siemens: 9 (5.7%) Motorola: 11 (7.0%) Siemens: 18 (5.0%) Huawei: 51 (9.7%) Sony: 8 (7.6%)
BT: 5 (3.2%) Siemens: 8 (5.1%) Interdigital: 15 (4.2%) Siemens: 26 (4.9%) Nortel: 7 (6.7%)
Table 1
Essential patents in mobile telecommunications standards (see appendix for a description of patent measures) a).
NMT GSM
late b)
WCDMA early c) WCDMA middle d) WCDMA late e) LTE
early f)
Reported essential patent families None/Few 561 732 1425 1884 211
Evaluated essential patent families None/Few 158 157 358 526 105
Over-reporting N/A 255% 366% 298% 258% 101%
Number of ﬁrms with reported essential patents None/Few 45 g) 47 g) 50 58 14
Number of ﬁrms with evaluated essential patents None/Few 19 18 18 36 13
Herﬁndahl index of reported essential patents, H N/A 0,181 0,200 0,161 0,127 0,276
Normalized Herﬁndahl index, H* N/A 0,163 0,182 0,144 0,111 0,220
Herﬁndahl index of evaluated essential patents, H N/A 0,240 0,161 0,161 0,132 0,330
Normalized Herﬁndahl index, H* N/A 0,198 0,097 0,112 0,108 0,274
a Based on data available in reports from Fairﬁeld Resources International.
b Study based on patents reported to ETSI as of June 6, 2007.
c Study based on patents reported to ETSI as of beginning of 2004.
d Study based on patents reported to ETSI as of January 1, 2006.
e Study based on patents reported to ETSI as of December 31, 2008.
f Study based on patents reported to ETSI as of June 30, 2009.
g Informed assumptions based on available data. The Herﬁndahl indices are not sensitive to these assumptions.
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to a former CEO of a competing ﬁrm, this also led to Qualcomm shifting strategies and becomingmore proactively involved in
the UMTS group of standardization, leaving behind its previous strategy of waiting at the side with a few essential patents in
order to generate future license fees by blocking power.
Competing standards in the fourth generation (LTE-Advanced)
The Internet Protocol based Long Term Evolution (LTE) was in 2004 suggested by NTT DoCoMo to succeed GSM and UMTS
as a fourth generation standard. Although LTE is commonly called 3.9G, due to too low download rates, it is closely related to
its successor LTE-Advanced, which is a true 4G standard.4 At this point the standardization work was well established, and
patents had become a natural mechanism of governance in the innovation ecosystem. As seen from Table 1 the total number
of ﬁrms with standard-essential patents (SEPs) as well as the total number of SEPs increased from 1G to 3G, and seemingly
also to 4G as indicated by other data.5 Some SEPs read on several standards in the 1G-4G sequence and therefore become
what we can call multi-generational patents.6 Suchmulti-generational patents preserve incumbency across generation shifts,
as was the case with several of Ericsson's patents in the shifts to 3G and 4G.
With increasing focus on multimedia and data transfer, and decreasing focus on pure voice transfer, the mobile tele-
communication industry was convergingwith the computer industry, fromwhich an alternative standard,WiMAX, was being
developed by Intel, Cisco and others. Once again new players, this time from the computer industry, seemed to impact the
established group of ﬁrms working with GSM/UMTS/LTE, albeit in a different way than previously. On June 8, 20087, Alcatel-
Lucent, Cisco, Clearwire, Intel, Samsung and Sprint Ally stated that theywere to create a patent pool, the Open Patent Alliance,
to give access to WiMAX-related patent licenses at limited and predictable cost. However, Ericsson and other ﬁrms in the
GSM/UMTS/LTE group raised concerns about the fact that the WiMAX group, including Intel, wanted to create a communi-
cation standard from which little revenues were generated to innovators in the telecommunications ﬁeld while at the same
time enabling income in other areas due to dominant positions in for example processor technologies (Brismark and Alfalahi,
2008). Hence, the strategy of the new competitors was this time not related to blocking power, but rather consisted of4 Thus, LTE could be viewed as a so-called gap ﬁller technology, temporarily ﬁlling a time gap on the market in a shift between two major generations.
Previous generations also had gap ﬁller technologies, e.g. GSM Edge and NMT-900.
5 The 2G system GSM was in the early 1990s covered by over 2000 patents of which ca 30 were standard-blocking patents (Granstrand, 1999) while the
4G LTE system was covered by over 4.700 declared SEPs in the 2010s (EU Court of Justice Judgment, 2015 in Huawei v. ZTE).
6 Some SEPs also read across competing standards and constitute another type of multi-standard patents.
7 See http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2008/prod_060908b.html [Accessed on May 10, 2013].
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assets in order to generate revenues on the other hand. However, Ericsson clearly stated that it would not give away its
WiMAX-related patents and licenses for free to the WiMAX group (Brismark and Alfalahi, 2008).
At the same time, the LTE group tried to decrease entry barriers by suggesting caps to total royalty rates, as for example
expressed by Ericsson, Nokia, and Alcatel-Lucent agreeing upon a single-digit maximum aggregate royalty rate for LTE.
However, the LTE group mainly relied upon bilateral agreements rather than patent pooling,8 and statements of royalty rates
required from individual ﬁrms, as summarized by Stasik (2010), aggregated to much more than a single-digit. This indicates
the difﬁculties with setting cap royalties in standards with multiple patent holders, inhibiting access to technologies for
outsiders. This is also exempliﬁed by Research InMotion's (RIM) acquisition of at least 66 patents from Ericsson in 2008 for an
estimated price of $172M (Stasik, 2010). Stasik argues that this was the price RIM had to pay for being able to compete in the
wireless industry, since the patents would enable improved possibilities for cross-licensing.9
The smartphone patent war
The previous section ended with describing RIM's purchase of patents to increase its competitiveness in the wireless
industry. Another, and much larger, purchase of patents was made by Google in 2011 when it purchased Motorola Mobility
and its patent portfolio for $12.5 billion to “help protect the Android ecosystem”, as stated on Google's webpage.10 Google's
Android operating system and the supporting handset manufacturers competed with Apple in the smartphone industry, and
Google needed patents to increase its retaliatory power to fend off litigation threats from Apple and others. A number of
handset manufacturers using the Android operating system appreciated this move, as exempliﬁed by a statement by J.K. Shin,
President of Samsung's Mobile Communications Division: “We welcome today's news, which demonstrates Google's deep
commitment to defending Android, its partners, and the ecosystem.”11 A few years later, in 2014, it was announced that
Google was to sell the Motorola Mobility business for only $2.9 billion (compared to the acquisition price at $12.5 billion),
while keeping most of the patent portfolio, illustrating the value and importance of the patents in Google's initial
acquisition.12
Patent-based competition in smartphone handsets and operating systems was thus progressing in parallel with the
development of the technological standards. The patent-based competition in the area of smartphones actually became
even ﬁercer than in the area of the underlying communication standards, and the situation developed into what has been
commonly denoted a smartphone patent war. Between 2009 and 2015 a vast amount of patent infringement lawsuits
were ﬁled in various jurisdictions, including many lawsuits ﬁled by so called patent trolls or non-practicing entities
(NPEs).13
In a study of the US patent litigations in the smartphone industry involving at least one of the ﬁrms Motorola, Microsoft,
Apple, and Samsung, Graham and Vishnubhakat (2013) investigated the 133 involved patents. Many of these were software-
related, and contrary to the belief that the smartphone patent war was driven by low-quality patents, they found that among
the 21 patents with court decisions including indications of validity, 17 were valid (or likely valid), and only 4 were invalid (or
likely invalid). In another study, Lloyd et al. (2011) identiﬁed 298 litigated smartphone patents, and analyzed these patent
litigations. In that study, Motorola, Qualcomm, and Apple were found to be the most frequent plaintiffs, while Apple, Nokia
and New York Times were the most frequent defendants, see Table 3. The three most frequently disputed smartphone
technologies (in number of litigated patents) were mobile data access (75), touch screen technology (27), and mobile data
transmission (25). The set of top plaintiffs differ from the set of top patent holders in the standards, which illustrates that the
smartphone patent war is not primarily fought with patents that are necessary to build upon the standard, but rather with
patents on non-standard complementary technologies and patents.14
One of the most reported ﬁghts in the smartphone patent war was the one fought by Apple and Samsung, involving
patents related to their smartphone product lines (iPhone and Galaxy, respectively). Samsung's (and many other Korean
ﬁrms') IP awareness had by and large been awakened by a patent infringement case in the 1980s involving ten US patents on
DRAM held by Texas Instruments (Lee and Kim, 2010). Just as in the cases of Ericsson, Nokia, and other European ﬁrms (e.g.,
Granstrand, 1999; Granstrand and Holgersson, 2012), Samsung's patent awareness was raised by having to defend itself
against a major actor from the US, where patent awareness and IP strategies had been established much earlier, in turn
leading to Samsung adopting a strategy for patent protection, establishing an IP division, and making efforts to increase in-
house innovativeness (Lee and Kim, 2010). Thus, when the litigations in the smartphone industry picked up pace Samsung
was no newcomer in the patent ﬁeld. In an interview in 2011, Samsung's head of litigation explained why Samsung was a8 See, e.g., http://www.telecompaper.com/news/qualcomm-will-not-take-part-in-3g3p-partnership–224725[Accessed on February 10, 2013] and http://
www.telecompaper.com/news/nokia-ericsson-decide-not-to-join-3g3p–373812[Accessed on February 10, 2013].
9 Stasik (2010) argues that selling 50 to 100 patents did not affect Ericsson's bargaining position much (due to its vast amount of patents in the ﬁeld), and
it might therefore have been a way for Ericsson to free some cash from unused assets.
10 See http://www.google.com/press/motorola/[Accessed on May 19, 2014].
11 As cited in http://www.google.com/press/motorola/[Accessed on May 20, 2014].
12 See, e.g., http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/29/technology/mobile/motorola-lenovo/[Accessed on May 20, 2014]
13 Taking on the trolls, Fortune, March 17, 2014.
14 This has also been conﬁrmed by interviews with IP managers of Ericsson and Huawei.
Table 3
Companies asserting and defending the most patents (Lloyd et al., 2011, p. 9).
Plaintiffs asserting the most
patents in data set
Number of
patents asserted
Defendants having the
most numbers of patent
assertions in data set
Number of patents
asserted against
Motorola 41 Apple 50
Qualcomm 24 Nokia 21
Apple 20 New York Times 20
Helferich Patent Licensing 20 HTC 15
Nokia 14 RIM 14
Microsoft 10 Motorola 13
Eastman Kodak 8 Samsung 12
Oracle 7 Motorola 9
Pumatech 7 Google 8
RIM 6 Microsoft 7
WiAV Solutions 6
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broadest product ranges. The smartphone industry was furthermore a huge industry with high growth and good proﬁtability.
Samsung, with more than 200 employees in its central IP organization and at least another 300 working with IP prose-
cution in their R&D organization (as of November 2011), had according to its head of litigation an IP litigation strategy that
was much more defensive than offensive (interviews reveal a similar situation in Huawei, another Asian newcomer in the
ﬁeld). This was conﬁrmed by a NY Times article which identiﬁed 127 smartphone patent lawsuits involving Samsung. In only
four of these Samsung was the plaintiff while the other 123 lawsuits involved Samsung as defendant, many of these being
ﬁled by NPEs.15 According to its head of litigation, one of the explanations of this asymmetry was that Samsung was at very
high risk when initiating litigation, since there are many opportunities to countersue such a big company, plus the fact that
most competing ﬁrms also were Samsung's customers in that they procured components from Samsung. This was for
example the case with Apple.
This section started with the description of how Google in 2011 acquired Motorola Mobility. The main reason for this
acquisitionwas to get hold of the patent portfolio of Motorola Mobility. However, Google also inherited a number of lawsuits
involving Apple in this acquisition. These lawsuits were ﬁnally settled in May 2014 (in a settlement that did not include a
cross-license agreement), and Google and Apple then also stated that they had “agreed to work together in some areas of
patent reform”.16 Future has to tell whether this was the beginning of the end of the smartphone patent wars, or the end of the
beginning.
Analysis and discussion
The case provides several insights about the dynamics of strategic IP management, appropriation, open innovation, and
innovation ecosystems. The different technological generations constitute developments within an innovation ecosystem
with clearly identiﬁable cooperative and competitive relations among actors as well as complementary and substitute re-
lations among technologies and products. The innovation ecosystemwas governed in a hybrid or quasi-integrated formwhich
falls between an integrated corporate innovation system and a disintegrated market organization (cf. Granstrand, 1982;
Williamson, 1991, 1996). Standard-setting can use pure market mechanisms, giving a de facto standard, or pure manage-
ment mechanisms, giving an administered standard, or a mix of these mechanisms as in our case. The latter typically involves
some form of open collaborative innovation between competing ﬁrms (coopetition) with some form of licensing among
them.
Thus, implicit and explicit IP contracting were used for governing this collaboration. Below, we will ﬁrst develop the
concepts of technology governance and technology accessibility, concepts that help us better understand open innovation
and appropriability in innovation ecosystems. We will then expand Teece's PFI framework with the addition of comple-
mentary and substitute appropriability regimes.
Governance and accessibility for appropriation and open innovation
The development in the case explicates the concept of appropriation in innovation ecosystems, and the link between
complementary assets and IP strategy was illustrated in several instances. For example, in the NMT generation, the involved
actors used limited patenting, and relied upon monopolistic market protection for capturing value from R&D investments.
The limited patenting endured also in the early GSM generation, when the actors relied upon implicit contracting and
gentlemen's agreements in technology development and coordination, until Motorola entered into GSM with an offensive15 Fighters in a patent war, New York Times, October 7, 2012.
16 See, e.g., http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/16/us-apple-google-settlement-idUSBREA4F0S020140516.
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ﬁrm was thus more dependent on the appropriability regime to proﬁt from innovation through extensive patenting and
licensing. While Teece (1986) argues that ﬁrms turn to complementary assets when the appropriability regime is weak for
their technologies, this case shows that ﬁrms with relative lack of complementary assets can shape and tighten their
appropriability regimes to proﬁt from innovation. Similarly, a subsequent event in the case, the creation of the WiMAX
standard, illustrates how actors with strong positions in complementary assets may want to weaken the appropriability
regime of a systems technology in order to enable quick and widespread diffusion of it while relying on the complementary
assets for their competitive advantage in order to proﬁt from innovation.
While the above addresses complementary assets in general, we now move to complementary technologies more
speciﬁcally. After Motorola's disruption of the European industry, mobile telecommunications became an area for
extensive patenting and explicit technology license contracting, as well as litigations. In innovation ecosystems, the
appropriation strategies of different actors are highly interdependent, due to the fact that the innovations and tech-
nologies are interdependent and complementary. Once one actor starts a patent offense, everyone else has to follow to
create retaliatory power (Granstrand, 1999; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), thus resulting in an irreversible strategy shift in the
innovation ecosystem (Jell et al., forthcoming).
The case moreover shows that when the mode of technology control changes so that formal legal instruments such as
patents increasingly are being used, the mode of coordinationmay also need to change, leading to an increased level of formal
patent licensing and to some extent patent litigation. We denote this as a shift from informal to formal technology governance
in the innovation ecosystem,meaning thatmore formal control and coordinationmechanisms are being used. This distinction
between formal and informal technology governance relates to the distinction between explicit contracting enforceable by
law, implicit contracting enforceable by markets (Klein et al., 1978) or social norms (Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom et al., 1999), and
possibly no contracting at all. The distinction also relates to different streams of literature related to open innovation. While
open innovation scholars generally focus on collaborating and trading and licensing IP (Chesbrough, 2003; West et al., 2014),
user innovation and open source scholars have emphasized openness of the technology itself, in terms of its characteristics of
nonrivalry and nonexcludability (O'Mahony, 2003; von Hippel, 2005; Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011), also pointing at the
informal governance of communities for innovation (e.g., O'Mahony, 2003). Our case then indicates that informal technology
governance is more fragile (cf. Ostrom, 1990) than formal technology governance, as opportunism is difﬁcult to control with
informal means when new actors enter and innovation ecosystems grow large. However, formal technology governance, in
form of for example increased patenting and formal license contracting, does not necessarily imply decreased use of open
innovation as we will show below (e.g., Bogers, 2011; Zobel et al., 2016; Holgersson and Granstrand, 2017).
After the shift to formal technology governance, the mobile telecommunication industry experienced hold-up situations
in which accessibility to certain technologies became limited. The aggregate license cost became a signiﬁcant barrier to
entry for new ﬁrms, due to many and disperse IPRs and IPR holders. Various actors in the innovation ecosystem then raised
concerns about the difﬁculties to collect or assemble all necessary IPRs to produce telecommunication equipment, and the
negative effects this had on the industry as a whole. To mitigate this the FRAND requirements to license standard-essential
patents at fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms were formally established through ETSI. This is an example of
how institutions (such as ETSI and FRAND) can be explicitly or implicitly formed to mitigate transaction costs (North, 1990).
Although formal technology governance is often used for limiting accessibility to technologies in order for innovators’ to
collect monopolistic rents (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Teece, 1986; Granstrand, 1999; Scotchmer, 2004), formal technology gover-
nance can thus also be used in order to ensure a high level of technology accessibility. Needless to say, intangible assets can
be accessed by several parties simultaneously. The accessibility to IP is therefore an important decision dimension for IP
strategy, which also makes it more complex than the management of physical property rights since owners of IPRs can use
access and veto rights speciﬁcally and sometimes independently (Bel, 2013).
The accessibility of available technologies is here taken to mean a characteristic describing how easy or cheaply tech-
nologies can be accessed and used by non-owners. Seen from the point of view of an actor or coalition of actors, technology
accessibility could be inbound or outbound, where the inbound accessibility of a technology depends on the outbound
technological accessibility of other actors. Depending on the mode of technology governance employed by an actor or coa-
lition of actors, implicit and/or explicit contracting is used to transfer or share different types of IPRs, and the related contracts
are associated with costs and prices (although they might sometime be zero) that impact the accessibility for non-owners.17
Technology accessibility can be governed by the use of different types of license contracts, such as the FRAND licensing re-
quirements in our case or the General Public License (GPL) in open source software. The GPL is a formal type of contract aimed
to protect the rights of users to view, modify, and distribute the technology/code (O'Mahony, 2003), i.e. to enable high
accessibility.18 Accessibility can also be governed informally, for example through social norms (O'Mahony, 2003).17 Our concept of (outbound) technology accessibility is thus closely related to the distinction between selling and (freely) revealing knowledge/tech-
nologies in outbound innovation processes (Dahlander and Gann, 2010). While the former is typically related to technology trade of various forms (Arora
et al., 2001), the latter emphasizes beneﬁts from freely revealing information about innovations (Harhoff et al., 2003), meaning that “exclusive intellectual
property rights to that information are voluntarily given up by the innovator” (Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011, p. 1401).
18 Note that the patent system intends not only to offer temporary private rights to a technology, but also to diffuse patented technologies through patent
publications.
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Technologies can be more or less accessible to different non-owners/non-holders, and technology owners/holders can
differentiate accessibility among a set of potential accessing actors. For example, a patent holder can offer a cheap license to
non-competitors while not offering a license at all to competitors, who in turn might prefer another licensor of a substitute or
try to invent around. Alternatively, a group of owners of complementary standard-essential technologies can cross-license
their technologies more or less freely within the group, while effectively locking out anyone lacking standard-essential
patents or bargaining power more generally (cf. UMTS). Similarly, ﬁrms can selectively share subsets of their technologies
at low or no cost, while other technologies are licensed at high cost or kept completely proprietary (Henkel, 2006; Henkel
et al., 2013), indicating differentiated accessibility not only across actors but also across technologies. This illustrates the
multitude of combinatorial possibilities across open and closed forms of innovation in an innovation ecosystem.
Whether an innovation is easy or not to imitate is thus not the one main characteristic of an appropriability regime.
Imitation is just one way in which an actor can access technologies developed by others. For example, several events in our
case illustrate how actors in the innovation ecosystemwillfully try to increase accessibility to their joint systems technology
in order to decrease transaction costs and promote the continuous development and use of it through open innovation. They
may do so by informal as well as by formal technology governance, as exempliﬁed in the different technology generations.
To summarize this section, several stages or phases in the evolution of IP management can be identiﬁed in the mobile
telecommunications case, see Table 4.19 The innovation ecosystem evolved from an initial stage of an anti-patent regime. As a
response to offensive IP strategies with harsh licensing requirements and litigation threats, companies with weak patent
portfolios or soft enforcement of them had to start building defensive patent portfolios and enter a stage of pro-patenting.
Some of these companies then eventually started to try to appropriate more value from their expensive patent portfolios
by using their portfolios more offensively, thereby entering a stage of pro-licensing and eventually pro-litigation. While the
shift to formal technology governance may be irreversible, a litigious IP space, sometimes referred to as a patent war, may
nevertheless eventually cool down. Recurrent contracting in an industry tends tomitigate litigation and new entrants with no
record or appreciation of recurrent contracting in an industry might therefore be more litigious initially. The litigation
propensity may then decrease and licensing propensity increase as time goes by and recurrent contracting develops. Liti-
gation in itself also serves a communication and coordination function across actors, although at high cost.Table 4
Mobile telecommunication generations and stages of IP management.
Stage Mainly during Some stage characteristics
Anti-patent 1G (NMT) Market regulation; Group of Nordic actors collaborating; No/limited patenting; Strategic
disclosure to foreclose patenting; Neglect of patent issues
Pro-patent 2G (GSM) Deregulation; New entrants, upsetting the collaborative club spirit and gentleman's agreement;
Defensive patenting
Pro-licensing 3G (UMTS) New entrants, threatening to block standards; Offensive patenting; Licensing and focus on
FRAND requirements
Pro-litigation 4G (LTE-Advanced) IP acquisitions for defensive and offensive use; New entrants; Smartphone patent warComplementary and substitute appropriability regimes
The case illustrates how an innovation ecosystemmay contain both cooperative and competitive relations between actors,
and both complementary and substitute relations between technologies, patents, components, applications, and systems.20
These features have to date not been sufﬁciently included in the analysis of appropriation, open innovation, and innovation
ecosystems21, and it allows us to move forward in our theorizing about appropriation and IP strategy in innovation
ecosystems.
In innovation ecosystems the accessibility and appropriability of a speciﬁc focal technology may be impacted not only by
patents on the focal technology, but also by patents on complementary as well as on substitute technologies/standards. For
example, the cross-licensing of complementary patents played an important role to enable accessibility among the main
innovators in the innovation ecosystem within the different standards, and Ericsson's patents related to the competing19 The labels of the stages are short and highlight the key new feature of IP management. As with all staged evolutions, the stages are not distinct and
disjunct in time but are approximate and typically overlapping with variations across nations and companies. Nor are they synchronous with the gen-
eration shifts but rather emerge during a generation, in fact due to critical events mainly related to the offensive IP strategies of new entrants, such as
Motorola (2G), Qualcomm (3G), and Apple (4G).
20 The concepts of complementarity and substitutability are applicable to multiple levels of a system.
21 The innovation ecosystem concept has for example been used to emphasize how a focal ﬁrm can build and use an ecosystem of external actors to reach
its business objectives (Chesbrough et al., 2014), how a focal ﬁrm can build a platform upon which external actors can innovate and design complementary
products, services, and technologies (Gawer and Cusumano, 2014), and how a focal ﬁrm's offerings are synthesized with other ﬁrms' offerings in a coherent
customer solution (Adner, 2006).
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patents related to UMTS. Thus, in innovation ecosystems complementary appropriability regimes (related to complementary
components/technologies/standards) as well as substitute appropriability regimes (related to substitutes) play important roles,
in addition to the speciﬁc focal appropriability regime.
In fact, non-standard complementary technologies, patents, and designs may be more valuable than standard-essential
technologies and patents, despite their non-essentiality. When a systems technology is subject to standardization and
collaboration across competitors, the appropriability regime for standardized technologies is often weakened by design, as
illustrated by the case. This is done to mitigate transaction costs and hold-up problems, which arise partly due to large in-
vestments in specialized and/or co-specialized complementary assets that fuel opportunism (Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1986).
While standardization may fortify the essentiality of the standardized technologies, thereby strengthening their appropri-
ability, the matched licensing requirements are designed to limit hold-ups and they thereby limit appropriability. Several
reports now point at patent holdout problems rather than patent holdup problems in themobile telecommunication industry
(Galetovic et al., 2017; Teece, 2017).
This creates interesting dynamics in the innovation ecosystem, as proﬁt distribution, and consequently incentives for
investments, shift from systems-essential technologies to non-standard complementary technologies, where a tight
appropriability regime can be shaped through IP strategy. An important strategy to proﬁt in innovation ecosystems is thus
to invest in complementary technologies with large user/consumer value, which are in turn related to their own appro-
priability regimes and complementary assets. For example, the smartphone patent wars are not primarily fought with
standard patents, as described above, but rather with patents on complementary technologies (such as user interfaces). The
most successful ﬁrms are now those who can build on the standards and develop differentiated and proprietary com-
plementary technologies with large value for users and consumers, i.e. ﬁrms like Apple and Samsung with products
building directly on the standards or ﬁrms like Facebook and Google whose products and services are enabled by the
underlying ICTs.
Finally as to appropriation, innovations and innovators may be dynamically distributed in the innovation ecosystem,
especially when several system generations appear over time as illustrated in our case where the main locus of innovation
shifted from incumbent service providers to equipment suppliers, new entrants and to some extent to end users. For example,
in the development of the 1G system NMT the main innovators in the innovation ecosystem were the service providers, not
the end users, distributors or equipment suppliers. Moreover, the main concern of the national state-owned service providers
was generation of consumer surplus and social return on investment rather than private return on investment plus the
prestige associated with being a technologically savvy and pioneering service provider. Similar social rather than private
concerns guided the development of 2G system GSM, although now equipment and component providers played a more
prominent role as innovators while the service providers continued to play the role of systems integrators (ecosystems in-
tegrators). The development was moreover speeded up in order not to let the by then ongoing deregulation in Europe end up
in a situation with competing standards, which was conceived of as reducing end user appropriation of innovation value. In
addition to that, international diffusion of the systemwas promoted by making the GSM technology easily accessible in order
to promote end user appropriation. The issuewas actually not an original PFI issue, i.e. the “business model” of the GSM group
was not a matter of capturing as much value as possible for the innovators. Thus appropriation of innovation values and the
reaping of economies of scope may be a more complex and multi-faceted dynamic issue in an innovation ecosystem than in a
traditional innovation context. The single focal innovator's appropriation problem for a single core innovation in the original
PFI framework then has to be extended to accommodate an interdependent set of appropriation problems in the innovation
ecosystem with different groups of actors over long periods of time.
Conclusions and managerial implications
This paper has described and analyzed the co-evolution of strategic IP management and innovation ecosystems, and in
so doing extended and nuanced the debate on IP strategy, appropriation, and open innovation in dynamic and systemic
innovation contexts. The case illustrates the need for including both collaborators and competitors and both comple-
ments and substitutes in the analysis and management of innovation ecosystems. Our analysis then explicates the
concept of appropriability with the concepts of technology governance and technology accessibility. Rather than focusing
on the ease of imitation, this perspective acknowledges the fact that ﬁrms can use IP strategy to shape weak or strong
appropriability regimes in order to beneﬁt from various forms of open and closed innovation. Our focus on comple-
mentary and substitute technologies moreover contributes to the PFI framework (Teece, 1986) within dynamic and
systemic innovation contexts.
More speciﬁcally, we identify the role of complementary and substitute appropriability regimes for the appropriation of a
focal innovation and for competitiveness in general. When systems-essential technologies are standardized and/or distrib-
uted across actors there is often a need to increase technology accessibility to improve the efﬁciency of the ecosystem. This in
turn leads to a weakened appropriability regime of systems-essential technologies and a need to turn to complementary
assets to proﬁt from innovation (Teece, 1986). Onemanagement solution is then to invest in complementary technologies and
tighten the related complementary appropriability regimes.
When the management solution to weak appropriability regimes for systems-essential technologies is to turn to
investments in complementary technologies with tighter appropriability regimes, an economic consequence is
M. Holgersson et al. / Long Range Planning 51 (2018) 303e319316underinvestment in systems-essential technologies. This in turn indicates the need for including complementary
and substitute assets and appropriability regimes also in policy analysis. This is an area where more research is
needed.
These conceptual and theoretical developments have several implications for managers. First, the sequence of stages of IP
management outlined above implies an extension of traditional IP management mainly oriented around patent protection,
prosecution, monitoring, clearance, infringement and related matters to involve also patent licensing, acquisition, and liti-
gation. This evolution is probably unavoidable as interdependent technologies and patents become more abundant and
dispersed in an industry with higher stakes involved, which calls for foresight, competence enhancement, and preparedness
in IP management. The evolution is moreover likely irreversible due to the arms race logic in patent portfolio races, which
calls for more offensive and value-oriented IP management, in short shifting the focus of IP management from protection to
value.
Second, increasingly multi-technological and multi-actor systems technologies call for extending IP strategy attention to
the larger innovation ecosystem with its cooperative and competitive actor relations and its dispersed complementary and
substitute assets, especially if compatibility standards are or could be expected to be heavily involved. Our focus on com-
plementary technologies and complementary appropriability regimes as well as substitute technologies and substitute
appropriability regimes incorporate the systemic nature of technologies that must be considered when shaping appropri-
ability regimes. Multiple levels of complementary technologies are conceivable, each of which has its related set of com-
plementary assets, in a system of assets and technologies in recurring shapes similar to fractals. Consequently, appropriation
is systemic and must be treated systematically.
Third, the systemic nature of appropriability regimes enables strategic combinations of different types of appropriability
regimes, in other words combinations of open and closed modes of innovation. This means that technology accessibility can
be differentiated across different technologies and across different actors in order to balance the beneﬁts from com-
plementors and complements with the drawbacks of competition and substitutes.
Fourth, when engaged in technological standards, investments and patenting in standard technologies are central.
However, when technologies are formally standardized and/or widely distributed across actors, there is typically a need to
allow for increased accessibility to systems-essential technologies, which in turnweakens the related appropriability regime.
Therefore, it becomes increasingly important to invest in and patent complementary technologies in order to proﬁt from
licensing or from sales of differentiated products and services. Thus, when a technology becomes standardized with related
licensing regulations, proactive patenting in both the standard-essential and the non-standard complementary technologies
is important to build competitive advantage.
Fifth and ﬁnally, control of complementary and substitute technologies through patents, especially through multi-
generational and multi-standard patents, is important in standardization (in which ample disclosures are typically
required), in turn requiring more elaborate patenting, licensing and patent acquisition strategies for appropriation, e.g. for
creating freedom to operate within a standard and promoting its diffusion to dominance among users and suppliers while
possibly limiting freedom to operate and diffusion for competing standards. Thus, the use of complementary technologies and
patens for appropriation has to be complemented with the use of substitute technologies and patents.
While our analysis focuses on IP strategy in innovation ecosystems and open innovation, it is also relevant for future
research and management of coopetition (e.g., Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Fernandez et al.,
2014; Bouncken et al., 2015) and platforms (e.g., Gawer, 2014; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; Bogers et al., 2017), respectively.
Our case is in fact an illustration of coopetition in a large innovation ecosystem, and of the important role of IP in the
management of coopetition. Moreover, the management of systems-essential (platform-essential), complementary, and
substitute appropriability regimes is conducive for setting up and appropriating value from platforms. The contributions in
this paper may be useful in also this context. For example, following our analysis a platform owner may beneﬁt from tightly
controlling the platform technology, while enabling substitutes on resource inputs as well as on downstream complements,
i.e., substitute complements, in order to increase user/consumer value and decrease user/consumer costs while at the same
time appropriating a majority of the value.
We can conclude that studying andmanaging complex innovation ecosystems are complex tasks. Hopefully this paper can
contribute to bringing some order to both types of complexities.Acknowledgements
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The distribution of essential patents over different actors is used to calculate the concentration of essential patents in the
standards with the Herﬁndahl index:
H ¼
XN
i¼1
s2i2

1
N
;1

withsi ¼
niPN
j¼1
nj
whereN ¼ total number of firms with essential patents
ni ¼ number of essential patents held by firm iThe Herﬁndahl index can then be normalized:
H* ¼ H  1=N
1 1=N2½0;1
*The concentration in terms of H and H can be used as measures of patent distribution within the standard. The con-
centration lies between 1=N and 1when using the Herﬁndahl index and between 0 and 1when using the normalized index. A
low concentration indicates that the patents are fairly evenly distributed over many patent holders that need to cooperate by
somehow sharing their technologies. A high concentration indicates that there are a few ﬁrms holding the majority of the
patents, and less boundary crossing transactions may be needed. The number of patent holders is also a useful measure of this
distribution.
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